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OUTLINE

THE GENERAL MINING ACT OF 1872

BY
LOREN MALL
ROATH & BREGA
DENVER, COLORADO

FEDERAL LANDS, LAWS AND
POLICIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES

THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW

PART III
HARD ROCK MINING ON THE PUBLIC LANDS; THE LOCATION SYSTEM
The purpose of the Mining Laws of 1872 was to encourage
mineral development in order to settle the West and establish
the industrial base of the East.
A.

B.

After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and before the
Civil War, explorers, trappers and miners roamed freely
over the^ unsettled public domain. Where surface deposits
of precious metals were found, miners took as many
nuggets as they could carry.
1.

They were trespassers on land owned by the United
States for the benefit of the nation because;they
were there without governmental authority taking
property of the nation.

2.

Nevertheless, the miners were more concerned about
hostile Indians and claim-jumping rivals than of
prosecution by the U.S. government.

3.

With news of the discovery of gold in California
at Sutter's Mill in 1848, the gold rush of 1849
was on.
Thousands of adventurers from the East
and all over the world flooded into California.

4.

Congress debated adoption of a federal mining law,
starting in 1848, but could not agree whether to
license small mineral tracts, reserving a royalty,
to sell small tracts outright for cash, or to
grant rights of free use in order to encourage
mineral development.

In order to establish order and to protect their diggings,
the miners organized mining districts and adopted
regulations to govern mining claims.
1.

The mining district regulations governed require
ments for making claim to minerals, notice, the
size and markings of claims, the amount of work
required to hold possession, and extralateral
rights.
Sometimes the mining districts conducted
civil and criminal trials.

2.

The mining district regulations were based on
concepts of equity, the rule of priority, and the
practical needs of miners.

c.

With the Civil War causing a desperate need for revenue,
Congress finally passed a federal mining law in 1866,
granting miners rights of free access to minerals on
the public lands.
1.

The federal mining law was not intended to produce
revenue directly, but through its economic spinoff,
to enhance the value of federal land and to promote
industrial production in the East.

2.

The federal mining law adopted the location system
established by the mining districts.
The first
mining law was the Lode Law of 1866 confirming the
right to locate claims on lodes. Lodes or veins
are mineral-bearing rock in place between country
rock with reasonably distinct boundaries on either
side.

3.

Since the Lode Law of 1866 did not authorize the
patenting of placer claims, Congress passed the
Placer Act of 1870 to extend the location system
to placers.
Placers are any mineral deposits
which are not lodes or veins of mineral in place
between reasonably distinct boundaries on either
side.

4.

Finally, Congress codified and expanded the Lode
Law of 1866 and the Placer Act of 1870 into the
Mining Law of 1872.

5.

The^ 1872 Mining Law, embellished by a host of
judicial opinions, statutory exceptions, administra
tive regulations and decisions, and supplemented
by state law, is the present location system.
(a)

The location system is the chief means today
for acquiring mining rights in the public
lands.

(b)

The leasing system established by the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 is the major alternative.
It provides an entirely different method for
acquiring what can be called the fuel and
fertilizer minerals. These leaseable minerals
are oil, gas, coal, potassium, sodium, phosphate,
oil shale, native asphalt, solid and semisolid
bitumen and bituminius rock, including oil
impregnated rock or sands, and sulphur in
Louisiana and New Mexico.
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(c)

6.

I.

A third system is provided by the Materials
Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604.
The
Materials Act provides that nonmetallic
minerals of widespread occurence, such as
sand and gravel, peat moss, and others, are
to be sold or granted under free-use permits.

The essence of the location system is the right of
self-initiation.
Unless mineral entry has been
restricted, the prospector may enter the public
domain at will, where he chooses, to search for
minerals.
(a)

Simply put, the mining law provides that the
first locator who discovers a valuable mineral
deposit and diligently pursues the find is
protected against rivals, and is entitled to
remove all minerals discovered even though
the locator does not elect to purchase title
in fee simple from the United States.

(b)

It is the myriad refinements of these basic
principals which constitute the mineral
location system.

All valuable minerals are subject to location except those
which have been specifically removed from the location
system by Congress.
A.

The Mining Law of 1872 expressly allows the location of
mining claims upon "veins or lodes of quartz or other
rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar [mercury],
lead, tin, copper or other valuable deposits." 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 23.
1.

Note that the act expressly names only certain
metals as locatable. However, diamonds were held
locatable in 1872 as "valuable mineral deposits."
14 Atty. Gen. 115 (1872).
After that, it was
settled that nonmetalliferous minerals were locat
able along with metalliferous minerals.

2.

The Commissioner of the General Land Office held
in 1872 that whatever is recognized as a mineral
by the standard authorities is a valuable mineral
deposit under the 1872 Act. Copp, Mineral Lands
50 (2d ed. 1882 ).
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3.

Chemical composition and crystalline structure are
the principal distinguishing characteristics of
minerals.
While sand and gravel do not have
definite chemical composition and crystalline
structure, still, they are locatable if they are
uncommon varieties.

4.

Proof of mineral character, even for sand and
gravel, is established if it is treated as a
mineral in trade or commerce or has special or
peculiar value in trade, commerce, manufacture,
science or the arts.
Stanislaus Electric Power
Co., 41 L.D. 655 (1912) .

5.

Stone useful as building material and salt deposits
were held to be valuable mineral deposits and thus
locatable. Congress adopted these interpretations
by the Building Stone Act of 1892, 30 U.S.C. § 161
and the Saline Placer Act of 1901, 29 Stat. 526
[repealed by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920] .

6.

Ordinary deposits of clay and limestone were never
held locatable even though they could be marketed
at a profit. Holman v. Utah, 41 L.D. 314 (1912).
Other decisions established that such minerals as
decomposed rhyolite, blow sand, peat moss, and
sand and gravel suitable only as fill material or
other ordinary uses were not locatable. In fact,
the Materials Act of 1947 was enacted to allow the
disposal of such minerals and vegetative materials,
including yucca and timber, by sale or free use
permit to local municipalities. The Common Varieties
Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 611, amended the Materials
Act of 1947 to legislatively prohibit any further
location of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite,
cinders, clay and other nonmetallic minerals of
widespread occurrence, leaving them disposable
only under the 1947 Act. The Common Varieties Act
means that building stone must be an uncommon
variety to remain locatable under the Building
Stone Act.

7.

Other mineral substances expressly held to be
excluded from location before the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 were fossils, meteorites, and crystal
line deposits in caverns. The Act of September 28,
1962, 76 Stat. 652, removed petrified wood from
the class of locatable minerals.
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8.

Petroleum was originally subject to the mining law
and locatable through mining claims. Union Oil
Co., 25 L.D. 351 (1897). The Oil Placer Act of
1897, 29 Stat. 525, confirmed this decision,
making both oil and gas locatable. Oil shale was
thus originally locatable under both the Oil
Placer Act and the mining law.

9.

Coal was considered a valuable mineral from the
first, but it was never subject to mineral location.
Instead, coal was sold at public auction and later
leased.
Coal Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 343; Coal Act
of 1873, 17 Stat. 607; Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, 43 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.

10.

Some mineral substances now subject to location
were not known or considered valuable for many
years after the mining laws were enacted. Other
unknown or unrecognized minerals may yet become
valuable mineral deposits and thus become subject
to location.

11.

Water was held not locatable in 1978 on the basis
that the substance located must not only be a
valuable mineral within the ordinary meaning but
must also be the type of valuable mineral that the
1872 Congress intended to make the basis of a
mining claim. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products
Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).

12.

43 C.F.R. § 3812.1 summarizes the situation:
"Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard
authorities, whether metállic or other substance,
when found in quantity and quality sufficient to
render the lands valuable on account thereof, is
treated as coming within the purview of the Mining
laws." ". . . A 'mineral' is a substance that (1)
is recognized as mineral, according to its chemical
composition, by the'‘'standard authorities on the
subject;" or (2) is classified as mineral product
in trade or commerce; or (3) possesses economic
value for use in trade, manufacture, the sciences,
or in the mechanical or ornamental arts."
43
C.F.R. § 2710.0-5e.

III. The United States reserved minerals from many agricultural
homesteads in the West, and -those minerals are subject to
'location of mining claims and^ieases by the United States.
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A.

B.

During the disposal of the public domain from 1800 to
1900, much mineral wealth of the country passed into
private lands, free of charge.
1.

The lands sold, and those granted under the preemp
tion and homestead acts, as well as the state and
railroad grants, were not to include mineral
lands, but only agricultural lands. The settlement
acts excluded known mineral lands.

2.

Conversely, the mining laws were the only legisla
tive authority for acquiring mineral lands.

3.

Unfortunately, there were no adequate scientific
means of classifying land as agricultural or
mineral, so the settlement acts were applied to
all lands from the Atlantic in the East to the
Rocky Mountains in the West.

Around 1900, the conservationists objected to further
patenting of mineral lands under agricultural laws,
especially to lands where coal deposits were visible
along the surface and lands where oil seeped to the
surface of water bodies.
This prompted President
Roosevelt to withdraw much of the public domain from
further settlement for a better identification of coal
and oil lands and for a better method of preventing
their agricultural settlement.
1.

Roosevelt first withdrew suspected coal lands from
operation of the settlement acts. To reopen the
westward flow of people and trade, Congress adopted
the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 81, 85. These acts allowed agricultural entries
and disposals, but reserved the coal to the U.S.
for later disposition.

2.

By 1909, to save oil lands, Roosevelt and Taft had
withdrawn most of the remaining public domain from
all forms of entry.
Congress stewed but passed
the Pickett Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 847 [repealed],
opening the lands to location of claims for metal
liferous minerals, but leaving them closed to oil
entries and agricultural entries.

3.

Congress then passed the Agricultural Entry Act of
1914, 39 U.S.C. § 121, to reopen the public domain
to agricultural entries.
The 1914 Act reserved
deposits of phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas
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or asphaltic minerals to the U.S.
Sodium and
sulphur were added to the list of reservations in
1933.
4.

In the arid West, large stock raising ranches were
necessary; 160-acre farms could not succeed on the
dry o r _mountainous lands.
So, Congress enlarged
the original 160-acre homestead to 640 acres by
the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C.
§ 291 [repealed].
It authorized settlement on
lands chiefly valuable for grazing and crops. It
reserved all minerals to the U.S.

5.

The oil lands remained open only to metalliferous
mineral entry after the Pickett Act of 1910, 36
Stat. 874 [repealed].' The 1914 Agricultural Entry
Act opened these lands only to agricultural entries
while Congress argued.
Finally, the deadlock was
broken in favor of leasing oil, and the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 was enacted. By it, an entirely
. different system for disposal of oil, gas and
fertilizer minerals was established.
(a)

The leasing system applies to the leasing
minerals which were federally reserved and to
leasing minerals on the public lands.

(b)

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 therefore had
the effect of legislatively withdrawing from
mineral location all oil, gas and fertilizer
lands of the U.S. and subjecting them to
leasing.

(c)

The Mineral Leasing Act provided for the sole
means of acquiring coal reserved under the
Coal Lands Act of 1909 and 1910 and of acquir
ing the fuel and fertilizer minerals reserved
under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, and
leaseable minerals reserved under the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916.

(d)

The only federally reserved minerals which
are locatable are the non-leasing minerals
under stockraising homesteads. The Stockrais
ing Homestead Act gives prospectors the right
to enter to prospect for locatable minerals .
and to locate mining claims. Thereafter, to
reenter, the location must have the landowner’s
consent, or agree to pay damages, or file a
bond with the BLM to assure such payment.
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6.

C.

Altogether, some 63,000,000 acres were patented
into private ownership subject to reservations of
some minerals, or all minerals, to the U.S. Most
of these reservations were made under the Stockraising Homestead Act which reserved all minerals
to the U.S. for the benefit of the public'. BLM,
Public Land Statistics (1977).
These severed
estates have proved to be troublesome; the ranchers
who knew the limited estate they were homesteading
now want to deny that the U.S. has the right to
allow mineral development under their land even if
the surface is restored. To gain their cooperation
so mining claims can be located, most mineral
operators give ranchers a royalty on the minerals
which the ranchers clearly do not own. Likewise,
the U.S. has legislated that consent of the rancher
must be obtained before the public coal owned by
the U.S. underlying private surf ace <Tands can be
leased.
Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328, § 1304.
The
price of such consent is usually payment.
The
provisions of § 1272 of'SMCRA precluding private
owners or lessees of coal from extracting them
without surface owner consent have been held
unconstitutional as a taking of property without
the compensation required by the 5th Amendment.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation A s s ’n v.
Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), ruling
stayed pending action on appeal, 100 Sup. Ct.
1306.

By 1934, many families of stockraising homesteaders had
gone broke on 640-acre ranches.
The range cattle
industry, which had grown up on the open range where
free grazing was allowed, had suffered the loss of
those free grazing lands to homesteaders, and overgraz
ing and soil erosion became serious problems. For
these reasons, both sides, namely the western cattlemen
and the eastern conservationists sought an end to
homesteading.
1.

The result was the Taylor Grazing Act which estab
lished grazing districts of the remaining public
domain to regulate and restore those grazing
lands.
The Taylor Act also precluded, further
settlement entries unless the land was thereafter
classified as suitable for some settlement entry.

K-8

I

2.

Since the administration quickly withdrew all the
remaining public domain, except Alaska, from
settlement entries, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
had the practical effect of repealing the home
stead acts. FLPMA formally repealed the homestead
acts in 1976 and dictated an end to Alaska home
steading as of 1986.

3.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Taylor Grazing Act are
still in effect.
They still provide that the
rights of the miner under applicable laws to
enter, prospect, locate, develop, mine, lease, or
patent mineral deposits on the public domain
within grazing districts are not to be restricted,
even_Jthough-~the___lands are leased, for ^grazing. 43
U.S.C. §§ 315d, 315e.
'
....

/

4.

'

IV.

t

The Taylor Act allowed exchanges of public land
for private to block up grazing districts and
authorized the sale of isolated, disconnected and
small tracts up to 160 acres. Exchanges and such
sales are now made only under authority of FLPMA.
In the Taylor Act conveyances, the Taylor Act
required the reservation of all minerals to the
U.S. Landowners who acquired surface estates under
_the_Taylor._Act hold' their land subject to the
Superior right of...lessees from the U . S . t o remove
the mineraLs_.
Carlin v. Cassriel, 50 L.D. 383
£1924); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1978).

The location system applies to all valuable mineral deposits
in the unreserved and unappropriated public domain.
I
A.
30 U.S.C. § 22, Mining Law of 1872: ’'Except as other
wise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the United States, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United
States and those who have declared their intention to
become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and
according to the local customs or rules of miners in
the several mining districts, so far as the same are
applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the
United States.11
B.

30 states were created out of the original public
domain, so the mining law applied to these public land
states at one time or another.
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V.

1.

There are unreserved and unappropriated public
lands left in only 19 states. These are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.

2.

The mining law for federal lands has little prac
tical effect in the midwestern and eastern states.

3.

The mining laws have the most importance in the 11
westernmost continental states, North and South
Dakota, and Alaska. There the laws apply to _the
unreserved and unappropriated public domain,
including federally reserved minerals under pri
vate lands subject to the Stockraising Homestead
Act and the Taylor Grazing Act.
The Dept, of
Interior has never issued regulations making other
federally reserved minerals subject to either
location or leasing. Acquired lands, those pur
chased or acquired by the U.S. from a state or
private party by purchase, gift, exchange or
condemnation, are not subject to location.

During the settlement era of the public domain, from about
1800 to 1934, Congress was not prepared to adopt specific
legislation on a regular basis to reserve specific lands of
special value from operation of the general settlement laws.
A.

While Congress did reserve special tracts, such as
Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the great bulk of
withdrawals have been made by the executive.
1.

From the first, the presidents withdrew lands from
entry_ to reserve them for Indian reservations,
wildlife refuges, and other special uses.
The
president asserted an implied authority of the
executive, as manager of the national assets and
government, to withdraw, even though the Constitu
tion specifically places all power to dispose of
and regulate the public lands in the Congress.
Art. IV, Section 3, Clause 2.

2.

To control the large scale withdrawals of oil
lands after 1900, Congress adopted the Pickett Act
of 1920, 36 Stat. 841 [repealed by FLPMA of 1976].
The Pickett^ Act authorized the president to make
temporary withdrawals from settlement and location
for nonmetalliferous minerals, and to set aside
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water power sites or lands to be classified for
their best use.
The Pickett Act expressly re
quired such reservations to be left open for
metalliferous mineral entry and location.
3.

B.

Finally, by Sections 704 and 204 of FLPMA of 1976, 43
U.S.C. §§ 704, 204, Congress reasserted its authority
over reservations and mandated they could be made
thereafter only under authority of FLPMA.
1.

After FLPMA, the executive can only withdraw
tracts of more than 5,000 acres for periods up to
20 years and only after reporting to Congress the
effect, including alternative sites, and the
geologic potential of the lands withdrawn. Cong
ress retains the right to revoke such withdrawals.

2.

Tracts of less than 5,000 acres can only be with
drawn by the executive for specific uses of known
resources.

3.

Nevertheless, the BLM is refusing to issue mineral
leases on some Overthrust Belt areas, especially
in wilderness study areas, without reporting
withdrawals to Congress.
The practice is being
challenged in two cases in the District of Wyoming
federal court.

'

C.

Even after the Pickett Act, the presidents con
tinued to make reservations, frequently doing so
under the implied authority because those with
drawals were permanent, at least until ordered
otherwise by an executive. The Supreme Court held
the presidents could make withdrawals under the
implied authority since Congress had acquired and
had not legislated otherwise. U.S. v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914).

No one, not even the BLM, knows how many acres of
public lands were withdrawn from mineral entry before
FLPMA, or even has a master list of those withdrawn.
Under FLPMA, each state BLM office is compiling this
data from the individual orders issued willy-nilly over
the years. The total acreage withdrawn is thought to
be some 70% to 80% of the remaining public domain. In
addition to withdrawals for Indian reservations, na
tional forests, national parks, national wildlife
refuges, national trails, national wild and scenic
rivers, wilderness and primitive areas, national his-
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toric sites, national monuments, national cemeteries,
and such better known withdrawals, there are reserva
tions for Naval Oil Reserves Nos. 1 through 4, military
reservations, powersite and reclamation withdrawals,
public stockraising water holes and stock driveways,
oil shale withdrawals and many other withdrawals for
specific uses.
1.

FLPMA ratified the bulk of the past withdrawals by
confirming the set-asides made for Indian reserva
tions, national forests, national parks, national
wildlife refuges, and national trails.

2.

FLPMA gives Interior until 1991 to prepare a
review of all other withdrawals in the West,
including mineral withdrawals on BLM and national
forest lands.
The report is to go to Congress,
with recommendations, for its action.

D.

Despite FLPMA, which barred executive reservations
except throught its procedures, President Carter with
drew 56 million acres in Alaska in 1978, citing the
Antiquities Act of 1906 as authority.
At the same
time, Secretary of the Interior Andrus withdrew over
100,000 millionj acres in Alaska under his authority
granted by FLPMA to make emergency withdrawals for up
to' 3 years. These withdrawals were intended to force
Congress to adopt an Alaskan Lands Bill to set aside
much of Alaska, but so far, no such legislation has
been passed out of Congress.

E.

Notwithstanding^ the overhaul of withdrawal procedures
made by FLPMA in 1976, a mineral entryman still must
determine the authority under which specific reserva
tions or withdrawals were made. Do that by examining
the master title (MT) plat and the historical index of
public land transactions in the state BLM office. Only
after_ such _a land status check will you know if the
land is available for location of mining claims.
1.

The MT plat visually portrays lands patented with
mineral reservations to the U.S., state land
grants, state selection lists, acquired lands,
patented mining claims, all types of withdrawals,
and unreserved public domain lands.

2.

The use plat shows temporary uses such as mineral
leases and special use permits.
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3.

VI.

Segregation of the withdrawals from mineral entry
used to occur when Interior approved an applica
tion for withdrawal.
After FLPMA, segregation
occurs when notice of the proposed withdrawal, is
published in the Federal Register.

There are several types of mining locations, and the locator
must choose the right type for the purpose or the location
will be a nullity.
A.

Mineral deposits may be located either as lode claims
or placer claims. The 1872 mining laws allows location
of a "vein or lode of quarts or other rock in place"
bearing valuable minerals.
30 U.S.C. § 23.
Placers
are all other forms of deposit.
30 U.S.C. § 3 5 .
In
many modern cases, the choice is difficult since many
low grade deposits now mined are disseminated deposits
which do not fall clearly into one or the other
category.
1.

A lode is a zone or belt of mineralized rock in
place, whether loose and friable or very hard,
with reasonable trend and continuity, separated
from neighboring nonmineralized rock (country
rock) by reasonably distinct boundaries on either
side. See McMullin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo. 230, 78
P .2d 964 (1938).

2.

Placers are all other forms of deposit, including
the traditional superficial deposits of precious
metals washed down from a vein or lode into the
bed of an ancient river or settled among the
alluvium in beds of active streams, as well as
deposits fixed between rock in place but which
lack reasonable trend and continuity, and reason
able segregation from the neighboring country
rock.
Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennon,
272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).

3.

Uranium in beds of sandstone is epigenetic, that
is, carried into the formation by some solution
after the host rock was formed.
Still, it is
locatable as a lode because it meets the require
ments defined for a lode.
Globe Mining Co. v.
Anderson, 318 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1957).

4.

To err between locating as lodes or placers is
fatal for a lode deposit will not sustain a placer
location and vice versa. Bowen v. Chemi-Cote, 432
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P .2d 435, (Ariz. 1967); Cole v. Ralph,
206 (1920).

B.

C.

252 U.S.

(a)

The definitions emphasize the present form of
the deposit more than its origin. The science
of geology does not matter since the mining
law was written for the practical miner, not
the trained geologist.

(b)

If a deposit is bounded on either side by
rock in place, it is likely to be considered
a lode.
If the ore is on top of the ground
and has no cover except a thin veneer of
soil, it is likely to be a placer.

(c)

In the case of a dispute, the courts tend to
find in favor of the first locator.

Lodes in placers fit into the same definitions; the
only difference is that the law gives lodes in placers
special treatment so that placer claimants are con
strained to identify and pay for lodes within the
placer upon patenting.
Otherwise, they would obtain
title to both deposits by paying only for the placer
deposit.
1.

If there is a known lode within a placer claim, at
the time of an application to patent to placer,
the lode must be listed and paid for separately.
30 U.S.C. § 37.
If not, the placer patentee is
not entitled to possess it. Clipper Mining Co. v.
Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220 (1904).

2.

If a placer patent issues before a lode deposit is
known to exist, the placer patentee gets it with
out additional payment.

The mining law of 1872 provides for tunnel sites where
a horizontal excavation, called an adit, is dug in
search of lodes or veins not appearing at the surface.
30 U.S.C. § 27. The tunnel site owner is entitled to
possession of any previously unknown lodes discovered
in the excavation for a distance of up to 3,000 feet
along the excavation.
1.

A monument must be placed at the portal of the
adit, naming the locator and stating the proposed
direction of the excavation, its height and width,
and the course and distance from the portal to a
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permanent object in the vicinity. The center line
of the tunnel site must be staked on the surface
to establish the surface area which is preempted
from location by a junior locator.

D.

2.

The tunnel site locator is protected for a dis
tance of 3,000 feet into the excavation, as to
1,500 feet in any direction of any blind lodes cut
by the excavation which were not previously known.
The tunnel site locator has priority even if the
lode is located on the surface before it is inter
sected in the adit.
Enterprise Mining Co. v.
Rico-Aspen Consol. Mining Co., 157 U.S. 108
(1897).

3.

The tunnel site, as such, conveys no surface
rights, and the locator who discovers a lode in
the excavation must make a lode location of the
lode on the surface.

4.

Discontinuing work for over 5 months constitutes
abandonment of the tunnel.

5.

Tunnel sites are uncommon today. Most exploration
for ores in mountains, or on flatlands, and whether
at deep or shallow depths, is done with drilling
rigs.

Mill sites of up to 5 acres may be located on nonmineral
land to provide space for working claims or reducing
ores. 42 C.F.R. § 3864.1-1. The m i l l .site m a y b e used
either in association with a specific lode or placer
claim or independently, as a custom mill site.
30
U.S.C. § 42.
1.

Rights to a mill site attached and the mineral
character is determined as of the time of location,
if construction is diligently pursued, and subse
quently improved mineral economics do not deprive
the owner bf his rights.
Cleary v. Skiffich, 28
Colo. 362, 65 P.59 (1901).

2.

It is difficult in some mining districts to find
usable land which is sufficiently norunineral, and
it can be difficult and costly to prove the non
mineral character to the BLM.

3.

Mill sites are not mining claims; they are usually
considered mining locations, but they may be
patented under the mining laws.
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4.

The right to exclusive possession of unpatented
mill sites depends upon actual use and occupancy
for a proper purpose; that is, for mining or
milling purposes.
An anticipated future use is
not sufficient. E.g., U.S. v. S.M.P. Mining Co.,
67 I.D. 144 (1960). See 1 American Law of Mining,
§ 5.34.

VII. Procedures for locating claims are well settled, but it is
often difficult in the field to follow the requirements
carefully.
A.

B.

The Mining Law of 1872 allows the location of a mining
claim by distinctly marking the location on the ground
so that the boundaries can be readily traced, and
making a record of the name or names of the locators,
date of location, and a description of the claim by
reference to some natural object or permanent monument
which will identify the claim. 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1.

State law or mining district regulations (no
longer maintained) are authorized to supplement
these federal requirements by detailing the loca
tion, manner of recording, amount of annual assess
ment work or improvements (not less than $100)
necessary to hold possession of a claim.

2.

Only in Alaska does the federal mining law require
that location notices and annual assessment affi
davits be recorded in the local records.
30
U.S.C. §§ 49a-44f.

3.

State law > in the western states requires the
monumentation of claims (staking) by cornerposts,
and, in some cases, side and end centerposts.

4.

State law in the western states requires posting
of a copy of the location notice on the claim at
the point of discovery and recording it with the
local county recorder.

For the first time, FLPMA of 1976 requires that claim
location notices also be filed with the BLM state
office.
1.

If state law, such as those of the Midwest and
South, do not provide for recording, the FLPMA
regs require recording directly with the state BLM
office. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2(a).
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2.

Location certificates must be filed with the BLM
for both mining claims and tunnel and mill sites
as well.

3.

The location certificate to be filed is an exact
duplicate of that filed or transmitted for filing
with the local county. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.0-5(i).
If not appearing on that "official record", the
BLM copy must contain other data, specifically the
name or number of the claim, or both; the book and
page of the local recording of the certificate of
location, and amendments; the name and current
mailing address of the owner, or owners, if known;
the type of claim or site; the date of location; a
legal description by township, range, section and
quarter section; and, a map showing the location
by reference to a quarter section. The filing fee
is $5.00 per claim or site.
(a)

U.S. topographic maps are frequently used.

(b)

Contiguous claims or sites and groups of them
in the same general area may be depicted on
one map if each individual claim or site is
identified. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2.

(c)

Failure to file with the state BLM office
within 90 days from location means the claim
is null and void, and that the land reverts
to the public domain, Solicitor’s Opinion,
GFS (MIN) S0-1 (1978).
The land may be
withdrawn in the interim or relocated by a
rival locator, and at the least, the original
claimant would have the expense of relocating
it.

4.

Transfers of nonpatented mining claims and tunnel
and mill sites must be filed with the state BML
office within 60 days of the transfer. Failure to
file transfers does not invalidate the claim, but
the transferee will not be given notice of any
government contest of the location.
43 C.F.R.
§ 3833.3.

5.

Location certificates for pre-FLMPA unpatented
mining claims and sites, those located on or
before October 21, 1976, had to be filed with the
BLM state office within the 3 years following the
Act, specifically, on or before October 21, 1979.
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43 U.S.C. § 1744. The BLM extended the deadline
to Monday, October 22, 1979.
(a)

There was a great land rush after October of
1979 to relocate claims which were deemed
abandoned for failure to meet the filing
deadline.

(b)

The BLM expected that approximately 6 million
claims would be registered, throughout the 11
Western States and Alaska, but only about 3
million were filed. The result was to elimi
nate many dormant claims which clouded title
for later claims which are being actively
developed.

6.

Location certificates for post-FLPMA mining claims
and sites, those located after October 21, 1976,
must be filed with the BLM state offices within 90
days from the date of location. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b).

7.

A document is not deemed filed with the BLM until
stamped by that office as received.
43 C.F.R.
§ 3833.1-2(a).

8.

The FLPMA requirements of 1976 to file location
certificates with the BLM for unpatented claims
and_ sites is the first time a central registry of
mining claims on federal
lands has been
established.

9.

Assessment work affidavits for claims, but not
sites, must also be filed with the BLM, using the
serial numbers assigned for the claim when first
filed.
(a)

Section 314 _of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1744,
required filing of an affidavit of perform
ance of .assessment work, or a notice of
intention to hold the claim, with the State
BLM office before December 31 of each calen
dar year following the calendar year of
location of the claim. If not, the claim is
conclusively deemed abandoned,
and many
claims have been so treated.

(b)

Prior to December 31 is on or before December 30.
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10.

C.

(c)

The time of location is determined by state
law.

(d)

The Mining Law of 1872 fixes the first assess
ment period as the twelve months commencing
at 12:00 o'clock noon on the September 1
following the date of location.
30 U.S.C.
§ 28.
Note that this is not the same as
assessment work
for the calendar year.
Therefore, as to claims located after noon on
September 1 and before midnight on December 31,
the first assessment work is not required
during the next calendar year. Nevertheless,
FLPMA requires that proof of assessment work
or a_ notice of intention to hold the claims
be filed during that next calendar year since
it requires such proof be filed prior to year
end of each year following the calendar year
of location.
A notice of intention to hold
the claim should be filed in this situation.

The BLM manages information about the unpatented
claims and sites filed with it by use of a computer.
Serial numbers are assigned to claims as the
location certificates are filed.
Those numbers,
the names of the claims, the names of the claimants,
and the quarter sections where the claims are
located are sent from a computer terminal in the
state BLM offices to a computer inthe Denver
Federal Center where the information is stored.
Thereafter, a computer printout in the foregoing
four parts is returned weekly to the state offices.
(a)

The_ computerized data enables the BLM, as
well as public users, to determine from the
printouts where mining claims and tunnel and
mill sites are.

(b)

The data also enables the BLM to identify
claims, or parts of claims, which the BLM
rules void if located on withdrawn, appro
priated, patented or otherwise nonlocatable
land. The computer also is used to eliminate
claims which become dormant for lack of
timely filings.

The location of a mining claim consists of distinctly
marking its boundaries on the ground, as required by
federal law, and doing the validation work required by
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state law. These include establishing monuments on the
corners and sometimes the side centers and end centers,
posting a location notice at the point of discovery,
and recording it in with the local county. Some physi
cal "discovery work" is required such as a shaft,
drilling or a survey map of the claim.
1.

"The location must be distinctly marked on the
ground so that its boundaries can be readily
traced. All records of mining claims . . . shall
contain . . . such a description of the claim or
claims located by reference to some natural object
or permanent monument as will identify the claim."
30 U.S.C. § 28. Absent a sufficient description
in the location certificate to enable identifica
tion of the location with reasonable certainty,
the claim is void. U.S. v. Sherman, 288 F. 497
(8th Cir. 1923).
(a)

The state laws govern the
boundary markers.

details

of the

(b)

Once the claim is marked sufficiently, obliter
ation of the monuments does not divest the
claimant of his possessory rights. Eilers v.
Boatman, 3 Utah 159, 2 P. 66 (1881), af
firmed, 111 U.S. 356 (1884). Only California,
by statute, requires maintenance of the claim
boundary markers. But, to fail to strictly
maintain the boundary markers subjects the
claims to overstaking on the assertion it was
not located properly or was not being maintained.

2.

30 U.S.C. § 2 3 provides no location shall be made
until the discovery of the vein or lode, but it
makes no difference whether the physical location
or the mineral discovery occurs first.
E.g.,
Creede & Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v.
Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co., 196 U.S.
337 (1904); Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337
(1919).
The location is unperfected until there
is a mineral discovery.

3.

Whenever the legal acts of location are established
and discovery of a valuable mineral has occurred,
a valid location exists, provided rights of third
parties have not intervened discovery. Only then
does the locator acquire a vested property right
as against the U.S. and third parties. Davis v.
Nelson, 329 F-.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1964).
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4.

Prospectors have the right to explore and prospect
the public domain, 30 U.S.C.- § 22; they have the
right to stake claims before making a discovery,
30 U.S.C. § 23; but their claim is not perfected
against the U.S. or third parties until there is
an actual discovery of a valuable mineral. Davis
v. Nelson, supra.

5.

The right of access to the open public domain to
explore for locatable minerals is a statutory
right. 30 U.S.C. § 22 makes such lands "free and
open to exploration and purchase . . . under
regulations prescribed by law . . . "
See, e.g.
Davis v. Nelson, supra.

VIII.The person who is actively and diligently exploring a prospect
is protected on the land being explored against another
locator of the same land. These rights prior to discovery
are known as the doctrine of pedis possessio.
A.

Exploration typically proceeds now by aerial surveys
for anamolies and scientific surveys for traces of
minerals in air, water, vegetation and soil samples.

B.

Favorable results may be followed by deep drilling for
potential host formations. The underground host forma
tions are then systematically traced for mineral traces
and finally narrowed to a mineral deposit.

C.

1.

Drilling and other exploration is extremely expensive.

2.

Explorers seek to protect their investment by
claiming all of the target area, thus insuing that
any commercial deposit within the region will be
under their claims. This is regional exploration.

The doctrine of pedis possessio is set forth in Union
Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919) and Cole v.
Ralph, 252 U.S.206 (1920): "In advance of discovery an
explorer in actual occupation and diligently searching
for mineral is treated as a licensee or tenant at will,
.- and no right can be initiated or acquired through a
forcible, fraudulent or clandestine intrusion upon his
possession.
But if his occupancy be relaxed, or be
merely incidental to something other than a diligent
search for mineral, and another enters peaceably, and
not fraudently or clandestively, and makes a mineral
discovery and location, the location so made is valid
and must be respected accordingly."
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1.

2.

3.

Other locators must be excluded by positive action.
The rival locator can establish rights if he
enters peaceably.
Cole v. Ralph, supra.
The
claimant’s possession must be exclusive. Adams v.
Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958).
(a)

Pedis possession protects
entry.

against

forcible

(b)

Entry must be denied but the denial need not
be successful or risk a dangerous confronta
tion.
The first claimant should yield the
ground, without consenting, and seek his
legal remedy.
In land rushes, the claim
block should be patrolled to deny all others
than authorized officials.

The claimant must be actively exploring for minerals
by work reasonably directed toward discovery of a
valuable mineral to qualify for pedis possessio.
(a)

Acts of location such as posting monuments
and recording notices do not qualify. Adams
v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958).

(b)

Mere performance of assessment work is insuf
ficient.
U.S. v. Stockton Midway Oil Co.,
240 F. 1006 (S.D. Cal. 1917).

(c)

Policing the claims, placing signs or fences
does not qualify. Ranchers Explor. & Develop.
Co. v. Acaconda Co., 248 F.Supp. 708 (D. Utah
1965).

(d)

Negotiations with others to do the work is
not pedis possessio work. McLemore v. Express
Oil Co., 164 Cal. 650, 130 P. 417 (1913).

(e)

Exploration plans, without more are insufficient.
Ranchers Explor., supra.

(f)

Construction of drilling pads may qualify.
U.S. v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co., 236 F. 481
(8th Cir. 1916).

The traditional rule is that pedis possessio
protects the prospector’s right not only to the
immediate vicinity of his workings but to the
entire claim, if he has staked a claim. Gemmel v.
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Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 72 P. 662 (1903).
Pedis
possessio rights do not extend beyond the claim or
claims on which the work is being done. Geomet
Explor., _Ltd. v. Lucky Me Uranium Corp., 601 P.2d
1339 (Ariz. 1979); Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234,
327 P .2d 308 (1958).
(a)

The federal courts in the Tenth Circuit have
held, however, that pedis possessio rights
can extend to a group of claims staked on an
area even though the claimant is only actually
in physical occupation of some of the claims.
MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F.Supp. 580, (D.
Wyo. 1971); Contintental Oil Co. v. Natrona
Services, Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir.
1978).

(b)

The MacGuire v. Sturgis rule for pedis possessio
holds that a locator is entitled to ". . . the
exclusive possession [of claims] on a group
or area basis, where, as here the following
exists or was done for his benefit:

(c)

(a)

the geology of the area claimed is
similar and the size of the area claimed
is reasonable;

(b)

the discovery [validation] work referred
to in the Wyoming Statute is completed;

(c)

an overall work program is m
the area claimed;

(d)

such work program is being diligently
pursued, i.e., a significant number of
exploratory holes have been systemati
cally drilled; and

(e)

the nature of the mineral claimed and
the cost of development would make it
economically impracticable to develop
the mineral if the locator is awarded
only those claims on which he is actually
present and currently working."

effect for

In Continental Oil v. Natrona Service, the
Tenth Circuit impliedly approved the MacGuire
rule by applying it. The senior locator lost
over half the 2,040 uranium claims to the
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junior because Conoco had not heep drill hole
logs of the validation drlling, i.e., the 50
feet of drilling done on each claim at the
time of staking to comply with the Wyoming
location law.
Without such a drill log, the
jury did not believe that 50 feet of hole had
been drilled on each claim. Also, some claim
monuments were found lying on the ground and
had never been erected.
Conoco lost 1,200
claims and kept 840 which had not been over
staked.
The trial court awarded 19 of the
1,200 claims to Conoco, notwithstanding the
jury verdict, because it had drilled 48 deep
exploration holes on them.

IX.

(d)

The Arizona Supreme Court refused to follow
the Tenth Circuit rule of pedis possession on
an area basis in Geomet Exploration, supra.
Area pedis possessio is the law in Wyoming,
however, and probably throughout the other
Tenth Circuit states, at least in the federal
courts where there is not state law to the
contrary.
The Tenth Circuit states
are
Wyoming, Utah [may have rejected area pedis
possessio in Ranchers Explor. & Develop. Co.
v. Anaconda Co., 248 F.Supp. 708 (D. Utah
1965], Colorado, New Mexico [rejected area
pedis possessio in Adams v. Benedict], Kansas
and Oklahoma, both later states being without
locatable public domain.

(e)

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
the Geomet case, so the law of pedis possessio
may be further defined in 1981.
Case No.
79-1203.
The Justice Department urges affir
mance as well as strict application of the
Coleman test of present marketability even to
contests between rival locators.

Discovery of a valuable mineral deposit is the sine qua non
of a valid mining claim, but the term is not defined in the
Mining Law of 1872. All the law requires is "discovery of a
vein or lode within the limits of the claim . . . ." 30
U.S.C. § 23. And, the law provides for patents to "any land
claimed and located for valuable deposits." 30 U.S.C. § 29.
Without a definition in the Act, the courts have had to
develop a judicial definition of discovery which has grown
stricter since 1933 and especially since the environmental
movement.
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A.

B.

The first test of disovery was set out in Castle v.
Womble, 19 L.D. 455.
"When minerals have been found
and the evidence is of such a character that a person
of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further
expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable
prospect of success, in developing valuable mine, the
requirements of the statute have been met."
1.

The Castle v. Womble rule is know as the prudent
man test. The test is not whether the individual
claimant feels justified in expending his labor
and means, but whether a reasonable person would
be so justified.

2.

The prudent man test was adopted by the Supreme
Court in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905).

3.

The test of mineral discovery has always been
applied most strictly against the locator when the
U.S. contests the claim that it has when a junior
locator overstakes a senior locator’s claim. See
Chrisman, supra. This is because the rival locators
are both claiming the same values, whatever they
may be.
Berto v. Wilson, 324 P.2d 843 (Nev.
1958).

The Mining Law of 1872 requires discovery of a valuable
mineral deposit within the claim. The mineral must be
exposed in discovery workings, brought to the surface
in core drilling samples, or in some other reliable
way, proved to exist.
1.

The presence of uranium, or other fissionable
source mineral, may be proved by radiometric
readings from probe instruments deep down the
drill hole, if corroborated by other evidence of
the mineral. Western Standard Uran. Co. v. Thurston,
355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).

2.

The discovery of a valuable mineral deposit may be
corroborated by the geology of the general -area,
other known ore bodies or discoveries in the area,
assay samples, and any other reliable information
which miners consider as bearing on the possibility
of developing a paying mine. Rummell v. Bailey, 7
Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958).

*■

C.

In 1933, the Dept, of Interior formulated another, more
stringent, test of discovery for nonmetallic minerals
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of widespread occurrence such as sand and gravel.
Interior succeeded in convincing the Supreme Court in
1968 to adopt this test, the present marketability
test, a compliment and refinement of the prudent man
test. U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
1.

The present marketability test requires the mineral
claimant to show the deposit can be mined, removed
and marketed, at present, at a profit after consi
dering accessibility, development, proximity to
market, existence of present demand, and other
factors. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.D.C.
1959).

2.

The present marketability rule requires that all
costs of mining, removing and marketing the mineral
be calculated and considered.
These costs even
include a reasonable rate of return on the capital
invested.

3.

The present marketability test, as adopted by the
Supreme Court, applies to all locatable minerals,
not just to nonmetallic minerals of widespread
occurrence.
Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th
Cir. 1968).

4.

Despite the Supreme Court’s assertions, the two
tests of discovery are not complimentary; they are
diametrically opposed.
(a) . The marketability test requires proof that
the mineral can be extracted, removed and
sold at a profit, at the present. The prudent
man test requires proof that there is a
reasonable prospect of success, in the future,
of developing an economic mine.
Thus, the
marketability test requires proof of present
profitability, and the prudent man test
requires reasonable proof of future profit
ability.
(b)

The marketability test delays the time rights
vest in the locator, leaving the location
vulnerable to government contest. The require
ment to prove present marketability during
the exploration stage, long before the cost
details can be accumulated, assures the
government of winning a contest. This defeats
the statutory right of locators.
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D.

(c)

The prudent man rule recognizes the realities
of mineral development. These include normal
market cycles_ and other forseeable future
conditions which the present marketability
test rules out.

(d)

Since Interior convinced the Supreme Court
the two opposing rules are complimentary, and
the marketability rule only a refinement of
the wll-settled prudent man rule, Interior
and the courts have had to reconcile the two
and apply one new rule. Since reconciliation
is logically impossible, the marketability
rule is given lip service and then largely
ignored except for nonmetallic minerals of
widespread occurrence, claims in areas of
special public interest, and applications for
patents to claims. The result is unpredicability, and the rule of men, not of law.

5.

The excess reserves rule of Interior which
would void all locations of valuable minerals
in excess of the reasonably anticipated
market need is contrary to the mining law and
the tests of discovery. Baker v. U.S., 613
F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980).

The effect of discovery of a valuable
deposit is to perfect the claim.

mineral

1.

The claim is segregated and removed from the
unappropriated public domain.

2.

The owner is entitled to exclusive possesson
of the surface, 30 U.S.C. § 26, and, as to
claims perfected after the Surface Resources
and Occupancy Act of 1955, subject to surface
rights of government agents and licensees
which may not materially interfere with
mining operations, 30 U.S.C. § 612, and to
all veins, throughout their depth, which
appex within the claim. 30 U.S.C. § 26.

3.

When the location of a mining claim is per»
fected, by both acts of location and discov
ery, it has the effect of a grant by the U.S.
of present possession. The claim is property
in the fullest sense of that term; and may be
sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited
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without infringing any right or title of the
U.S.
Thw owner's right is taxable by the
state; it is real property subject to judg
ment liens. The owner is not required to
purchase the claim by securing a patent from
the U.S., but so long as he complies with the
mining laws, and performs assessment work of
at least $100.00 annually, is entitled to
hold the claim and develop and market the
minerals without payment of royalties.
Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306
(1930).
X.

Extralateral rights, granted by the Mining Law of 1872, 30
U.S.C. § 26, give the locator exclusive right to all veins,
lodes and ledges, throughout their entire depth, if the top
or apex lies within the surface lines of the claim extended
downward vertically, and may follow the veins in their
downward course outside the vertical extension of the side
lines, but within the vertical extension of the end lines.
A.

Extralateral rights mean that, once a claimant establishes
the apex of a vein within the boundaries of the claim,
he may follow the vein on its downward course outside
the claim so long as he stays within the extension of
the end lines.
1.

The locator is presumed to own all ore within the
boundaries extended downward vertically.
St.
Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
194 U.S. 235 (1904).

2.

The one asserting extralateral rights under another's
claim must have the apex within his claim boundaries.
Consol. Wyo. Gold Mining Co. v. Champion Mining
Co., 63 F. 540 (N.D. Cal. 1894).

3.

Veins are more likely pursued now by vertical
shafts and adits dug from the shaft than by fol
lowing the vein downward. This presents difficult
problems of proving continuity of the vein in the
shaft with the vein whose apex is in the claim.
See Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
15 Wash. App. 1, 547 P.2d 1240 (1976).

4.

Blind appexes are those which do not outcrop on
the surface, but are somewhere below. The blind
appex must be _proved to be within the claim if
extralateral rights for that claim are to be
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recognized. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet,
98 U.S. 463 (1879) .
B.

Extralateral rights are confined, by the statute, to
such parts of the vein outside the claim as lie between
vertical extensions of the end lines. Thus, the loca
tion of the apex in relation to the end lines fixes the
sweep of extralateral rights.
1.

This means, ideally, that the apex should cross
both end lines, entitling the locator to exercise
extralateral rights to the greatest extent allowable.

2.

If the apex crosses one end line and passes out a
side line, the courts locate an imaginary end line
where the apex go outside the side line.
This
narrows the width of extralateral rights.

3.

If the apex crosses one end line and terminates
within the claim, an imaginary end line is fixed
where the vein terminates.
This also limits
extralateral rights.

-4.

If the apex crosses both side lines, the end lines
become the side lines, and vice versa, for fixing
extralateral rights.

5.

30 U.S.C. § 23 requires that claims be located
with the side lines parallel to the course of the
vein.
"A mining claim . . . may equal, but shall
not exceed, 1500 feet in length along the vein or
lode. . . . "
"No claim shall extend more than 300
feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the
surface . . . ."
Therefore, the strike of the
vein, its course along the surface, must be deter
mined to ascertain the orientation of the long
axis of the claim with the strike.
Argentine
Mining Co. v. Terrible Mining Co., 122 U.S. 478
(1887). This is the basis for changing the orientation of the claim, as previously described, in
determining extralateral rights and in fixing the
claim boundaries for patent, also. End lines may
only be brought parallel or adjusted if done
within a reasonable time and without including new
ground.
Doe v. Sanger, 83 Cal. 203, 23 P. 365
(1890).

6.

Floating claims are not allowed; that is, end
lines may not be moved from time to time to take

-
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advantage of subterranean developments.
Otherwise
uncertainty would result.
Iron Silver Mining Co.
v. Elgin Mining Co., 118 U.S. 196 (1886).
C.

The purposes of recognizing extralateral rights are to
encourage complete mining of a deposit by allocating
ownership of the entire deposit.
1.

Confining extralateral rights to end line exten
sions is intended to fairly allocate the deposits
among locators according to the surface of the
claims.

2.

If the end lines are not parallel, the sweep of
extralateral rights could be ever-widening. Thus,
30 U.S.C. § 23 requires parallel end lines.
End
lines will be considered parallel if substantially
so.
Grant v. Pilgrim, 95 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1938).

3.

If the vein splits and dips, in both directions,
the locator has the right to follow both.

4.

Extralateral rights do not extend into all lands.

5.

(a)

Extralateral rights extend into mining lands,
whether patented or unpatented, and whether
the other location is junior or senior.

(b)

Extralateral rights do not extend into pre
viously _patented agricultural lands because a
conclusive presumption arises, upon patent
ing, that these lands were nonmineral, else
the patent would not have issued.

(c)

Extralateral rights vest when a claim is
perfected by location and discovery; there
fore those vested extralateral rights do
extend into subsequently patented agricul
tural lands.

Extralateral rights do not attach to all mining
claims, only those with a vein or lode which
apexes within the limits of the claim.
(a)

Extralateral rights do not attach to placer
claims; they are not based on veins or lodes.
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(b)

XI.

Extralateral rights do not attach to dissemi
nated ore bodies which are bedded and nearly
horizontal because they have no apex.

6.

If veins intersect underground, the prior location
takes the mineral in the intersection, but the
junior location is entitled to a right of way
through the intersection.

7.

If veins fork or split, leading in two directions,
the senior locator has the right to both.

Assessment work is required by the Mining Law in order for
the locator to demonstrate that he was claiming possession
in good faith, for mining purposes, and to give notice to
rival locators of his claim.
Chambers v. Harrington, 111
U.S. 350 (1884); Udall v. The Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759
(1969), reversed on other grounds, 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
A.

"On each claim located after the 10th day of May, 1972,
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less
than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improve
ments made during each year."
30 U.S.C. § 28.
The
' assessment year is the annual period commencing on
12:00 o'clock noon on the 1st of September succeeding
the date of location.

B.

If the work is not performed as and when required, the
ground is then open to location by another claimant as
if no prior claim had been staked.
However, if the
intial claimant or successors resumes assessment work,
no relocation may be made.
30 U.S.C. § 28; Belk v.
Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881).

'

C.

.Until Hickel v. The Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970)
(the TOSCO case), only a rival locator could challenge
a claim by relocating it for failure of assessment
work.
The TOSCO decision held that the validity of an
unpatented claim depends on substantial compliance with
' the assessment work requirement. The TOSCO decision of
1970 recognized, for the first time, the right of the
government to contest claims for failure to do assess
ment work as and when required, but it may not apply to
any mining claims except pre-1920 oil shale claims.
1.

The TOSCO case is a minority opinion, difficult to
reconcile internally, and opposed to the Interior
rule in effect up to its adoption that Interior
had no authority to assert failure of assessment
work as grounds for invalidating a claim.

K-31

D.

2.

The TOSCO case was based on special facts, namely
oil shale claims located on ground which had been
withdrawn from location and not subject to reloca
tion by other private parties.

3.

Even though Interior amended its regs. to assert
that its power to challenge claims applied to all
minerals, it is doubtful that the U.S. can attack
claims to other minerals on this basis, at least
where the ground had been open at all times to
mineral entry and location.

4.

The resolution to this question will determine
whether the claimant should resume labor (to
revive a dormant location which Interior may claim
was void) or relocate (to initiate a new right).

5.

The Supreme Court held in 1980 that oil shale
claims were not subject to the usual discovery
test for a valuable mineral deposit requiring
present marketability because Congress had im
plicitly ratified the application of the prudent
man test to oil shale in hearings of 1918, 1930-31,
and 1956, clearly recognizing oil shale as a
valuable mineral subject to location and patent.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 48 L.W. 4603 (June 3,
1980).

The Mining Law of 1872 contemplates that assessment
work be performed after discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit and location of a claim. 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1.

"Discovery is the source of title to a mining
claim, and until a discovery of mineral is made
wit h i n t h e claim, the location is not perfected.
Accordingly, until a discovery is made, the ques
tion of the performance of assessment work is
immaterial." 2 Am. Law of Mining § 7.7.

2.

Before discovery, locators
comply with state law, and
requiring the filing of
after location of a claim
locators.
(a)

do assessment work to
since 1976, with FLPMA,
assessment affidavits
and to ward off rival

Before discovery, the locator has the pre
discovery rights of pedis possessio. Pedis
possessio requires actual occupation of the
claim in a diligent search for mineral.
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(b)

3

.

4.
E.

After discovery, the location is perfected
and actual occupation is no longer required.
Rather, rights are maintained by the construc
tion possession given by the recorded loca
tion certificates and by the performance of
annual assessment work.

Mere performance of assessment work before discovery
does not necessarily constitute diligent exploration
for pedis possessio purposes. 1 Am. Law of Mining
§ 4.8.
Since assessment work can only be done after a
discovery, it must be done to develop the deposit.

The definition of assessment work is that it must
directly tend to develop the deposit and facilitate the
extraction of minerals. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S.
636 (1882); Great Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Metals Corp.
of America, 86 N.M. 717, 537 P.2d 112 (1974).
It is
not the amount of the expenditure which counts,'but the
reasonable value of the labor or improvements toward
development of the claim which is critical.
Smelting
Co. v. Kemp.
1.

Exploration work to make a discovery
qualify as assessment work.

2.

Exploration work after discovery of a valuable
deposit to further define the limits of the de
posit and other characteristics such as its aver
age grade would qualify as assessment work.
Indeed, development drilling is usually essential
to mine planning and development.

3.

Development work is that which provides access to
the mineral deposit for extraction of ore. Devel
opment work therefore qualifies as assessment
work.

4.

Of course, actual
assessment work.

5.

Construction of improvements such as buildings,
shafts, the addition of machinery, and other
structures for extraction of mineral qualify as
assessment work.

i

does

not

mining operations qualify as
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F.

6.

Building a mill does not always count as_ assess
ment work because a mill does not facilitate
extraction of ore from the ground.

7.

Construction of ore houses qualifies as assessment
work but not residential cabins unless mining
operations were actually conducted and housing on
site was necessary to those operations.

8.

Construction of roads and bridges can be assess
ment work if it facilitates extraction of the
mineral.

9.

No list of work or improvements can be drawn which
always qualifies as assessment work. What quali
fies depends on the particular discovery.

By a 1958 amendment to the Mining Law, assessment labor
was defined to include geological, geochemical, and
geophysical surveys if conducted by a qualified expert
and verified by a detailed report filed of record. 30
U.S.C. § 28-1.
1.

These scientific surveys are the typical reconnais
sance method used in regional exploration to find
a deposit, but not to develop a known deposit.

2.

Scientific surveys are rarely filed as evidence of
assessment work, especially since the law requires
disclosure of the basic findings at specific
points.

G.

A fundamental requirement of assessment work is that it
must be performed in good faith for the proper purpose.
E.g., Sampson v. Page, 129 Cal. App. 2d 356, 276 P.2d
871 (1954).

H.

Assessment work need not occur on the claims, or even
on contiguous claims, despite the misunderstandings
flowing from a loose dictum in Chambers v. Harrington,
111 U.S. 350 (1884), but can occur "at a distance from
the claim itself." Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636
(1881).
1.

In Chambers, the Supreme Court said assessment
work performed off one claim can only qualify as
work for that claim if it occurs on a contiguous
claim.
But Chambers involved a shaft which can
only benefit specific claims if it is extended to
them by drifts or tunnels.
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2.

3.

Despite Chambers, courts do allow assessment work
to qualify even if performed outside contiguous
claims, at least if it tends to develop the claim
and facilitate extraction of minerals.
Thus,
road, ditches to divert water to the site, regional
drilling and other work in geologic basis have
been accepted. See 2 Am. Law of Mining, Ch. III.
(a)

The requirement of contiguity would be illogical.

(b)

The important test is benefit;
work benefits the claims.

whether the

The Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. § 28, specifically
allows the work done on any one claim to be appor
tioned among a group to hold all of them, if the
claims are held in common.
(a)

There must be a community of interest in the
claims giving some common right in the assess
ment work. The owner whose possessory right
depends on work done elsewhere must have a
legal relationship to the work done if it is
to inure to the benefit of his claims. New
Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co.,
102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert,
denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943).

(b)

If the work has a direct tendency to develop
two sets of claims owned by different parties,
the lessee of both sets of claims may apply
the work to both sets, even without the
consent of the owner where the work was done.
New Mercur.

"Upon the failure of any one of several co-owners to
contribute his proportion of the expenditures required
[for assessment work], the co-owners who have performed
the labor or made the improvements may, at the expira
tion of the year, give such delinquent co-owner personal
notice in writing or notice by publication in the
newspaper published nearest the claim, for at least one
week for ninety days, and if at the expiration . . . such
delinquent should fail or refuse to contribute his
proportion . . ., his interest . . . shall become the
property of his co-owners. . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 28.
1.

This 1872 forfeiture provision does not comport
with current concepts of due process notice holding
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service by publication isn't adequate notice when
the actual whereabouts of the party are known.
2.

It may be that the 1872 procedure is adequate
considering that Congress has the sole power over
the public lands according to such rules and regs.
as it deems necessary. Property clause.

3.

To be safe, however, it is advisable to obtain
personal service in forfeiture proceedings.

XII. Even a perfected mining location, if unpatented, does not
entitle the claimant to unfettered and exclusive use of the
surface.
A.

As to all claims not located or not perfected by a
discovery as of July 23, 1955, when the Surface Re
sources Act was adopted, the U.S. retains the right to
manage and dispose of the vegetative resources, to
manage other surface resources, and to use the surface,
for itself, its permittees and licensees, for access to
adjacent land.
Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30
U.S.C. § 612.
1.

The use of the mining claim surface may not en
danger
or materially
interfere with mineral
operations.

2.

If the locator requires more timber than that left
by the U.S., he is entitled to free timber from
the U.S.

3.

Except to the extent required to clear for mineral
operations and the construction of mining struc
tures, the locator may not cut timber or other
vegetative resources.

4.

Government permittees and licensees may go on
unpatented mining claims to pursue that right or
to gain access to other federal land for that
purpose so long as there is no interference with
ongoing mining _operations. Examples, not exclus
ive,
are hunting, fishing, camping.
U.S. v.
Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 1373 (E.D.
Cal. 1976), affirmed, 611 F.2d_ 1277 (9th Cir.
1980) (defining government permittees and licen
sees as general members of the public who need not
hold a written permit except as to an activity
which is specifically regulated).
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5.

B.

Guards may be employed to protect the claim, if
they give proper persons access, but unmanned
fences, barricades and no-trespass signs are not
proper. U.S. v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, 415 F. Supp.
1373.
The _locators of active mining operations
have the right to forbid trespass in their build
ings, mine workings and mills.

The regulations for surface
which were proposed by the
March 3, 1980, 45 FR 13956,
new impediment to mineral
domain.
1.

management of mining claims
Dept, of the Interior on
would create a substantial
operation on the public

Interior says that the Mining Law of 1972, 30
U.S.C. § 22, provides that exploration, location
and purchase of valuable mineral deposits on
public lands shall be "under regulations pres
cribed by law." 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-3(a) (proposed
Mar. 3, 1980 at 45 Fed. Reg. 13956-13979).
(a)

30 U.S.C. § 22, the Mining Law of 1872, does
not give the Secretary authority to make law
concerning appropriation of mineral deposits.
That power is reserved to Congress under the
Article 4 property clause. Const., Art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2.

(b)

Neither does 30 U.S.C. § 22 grant authority
to the Secretary to make regulations for
appropriation of mineral deposits.
Instead,
the only authorization in the Mining Law of
1872 to promulgate such regulations is that
in 30 U.S.C. § 38 which grants the power to
"the miners of each mining district." Butte
City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905)
(holding the authority to prescribe the
regulations is granted to the miners in the
mining districts, but may also be excercised
by the states, as successors); See D. Sherwood,
Mining-Claim
Recordation and Prospecting
under FLPMA, 23 Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Inst.
1, 9-10 (1977).

(c)

True, FLPMA requires the Secretary of the
Interior to take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the public lands, 43 U.S.C. § 1201; but the
same section provides that neither this
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section nor any other section of FLPMA "shall
in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or
impair the rights of any locators or claims
under that Act, including but not limited to,
rights of ingress and egress," except as
FLPMA requires federal recordation of mining
claims, provides for BLM wilderness study, or
specifically allows regulation of all mining
claims on public lands within the California
Desert Conservation Area.
(d)

The most reasonable interpretation is that
FLPMA does not authorize the proposed regs.
insofar as they would "impair the rights of
any locators or claims under [the 1872 Mining
Law], including, but not limited to, rights
of ingress and egress." It will remain for
the courts to determine of the BLM surface
management regs. can be sustained.

(e)

As opposed to BLM-managed lands, there is
statutory authority for the Forest Service to
control mining operations in national forests.
16 U.S.C. § 478 provides mineral development
"must comply with the rules and regulations
covering such national forests," but the
Mining Law of 1872 has not been amended so
much by this part of the Organic Act of 1897
as to allow the Forest Service surface man
agement regs. to bar mining operations.

(f)

The Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C.
§ 612, states that "rights to any mining
claim . . . shall be subject . . .
to the
right of the United States to manage . . .
the surface resources." This authority to
protect and sell vegetation and other re
sources should not be deemed a general
authority to_ control mining operations, and
it is not cited as authority by the Forest
Service for its regs. or by the BLM for its
proposed regs.
It does authorize the Forest
Service to bar use of a backhoe, bulldozer,
and blasting, even on a valid, perfected
mining claim, as unreasonable destruction of
national forest lands. Richardson v. Andrus,
599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied,
100 S. Ct. 663 (1980) .
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(g)

The Forest Service has required miners to
obtain approval of a plan of operations if
the proposed mining activity may affect
surface resources on land managed by the
Forest Service. 36 CFR §§ 252.1-252.15.

(h)

The^ proposed BLM regs. state "it is the
policy of the regulation [sic] to encourage
-the development of Federal mineral resources.
Under the 1872 Mining Law (30 U.S.C. 23 et
seq.), a person has a statutory right, not a
mere privilege, consistent with Departmental
regulations, to go upon the open (unappro
priated and unreserved) public lands for the
purpose of mineral prospecting, exploration,
development and extracting."
43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.0-6.
It is hypocritical to say the
regs. encourage mining.

2.

The proposed BLM regs. would apply to all locatable public lands, including stockraising mineral
reservations, but not to units within the National
Parks or Forests. The Forest Service has its own
regs. for these areas.

3.

The main thrust of the proposed BLM regs., 43
C.F.R. § 3809.1-1, is to require a plan of opera
tions be submitted to the BLM for approval prior
to any mining operations involving:
(a)

Construction or
landing areas;

(b)

Destroying trees of 2" or more at the base;

(c)

Using tracked
equipment;

(d)

Using motor vehicles off "open use areas and
trails";

(e)

Placing mobile or fixed structures for over
30 days;

(f)

Using explosives;

(g)

Operations which
water course."
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or

improving ;roads,

mechanized

"may cause

bridges,

earth

changes

moving

in

a

4.

The plan of operations must include,
§ 3809.1-3:

43 C.F.R.

(a)

The identity of the operator;

(b)

A topo map or sketch of access roads
surface areas to be disturbed;

(c)

The operation, means of performance, and
structures and facilities. The operator may
submit porposed reclamation measures;

(d)

The serial number of any claims;

(e)

For mining operation in wilderness areas, a
statement of the manner and degree of opera
tions before FLPMA was adopted on Oct. 21,
1976. Those cannot be exceeded because FLPMA
precludes impairing potential BLM wilderness
areas for inclusion in the Wilderness System.

and

5.

The BLM district office has 30 days to approve or
disapprove the plan or require changes, or may
state 60 more days will be needed for review.

6.

Even after a plan is approved, the BLM may require
modifications.

7.

The operator must file a bond in an amount deter
mined by the BLM as assurance of reclamation.

8.

The BLM may seek a court order to enjoin violations.
43 C.F.R. § 3809.3-2.

9.

The regs. recognize that the operator is entitled
to access to his mining operations under the
mining laws, but authorizes the BLM to locate the
access route, maintenance, and vehicles.
32
C.F.R. § 3809.3-3.

10.

The general public does not have a right to appeal
a BLM decision.

11.

The regs. contemplate eventual adoption of federalstate programs for adoption.

XIII.There is no legal requirement that mining claims or sites be
patented.
If they were validly located and the possessory
right maintained according to the federal and state laws and
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regulations, the claims remain valid without a patent.
Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220
(1904).
A.

The mining claimant only has a possessory title, one
dependant upon his maintaining possession and subject
to the paramount title of the U.S.

B.

Nevertheless, the mineral deposits in unpatented mining
claims may be entirely removed without obtaining a
patent or payment to the U.S.

C.

The Dept, of the Interior is now the principal adver
sary of unpatented claim holders.

D.

1.

The BLM may challenge claims for lack of discovery,
failure of assessment work, or nonavailability of
the land for location, or failure to file required
notices.

2.

The new BLM surface regs. are another means for
the BLM to impede mining.

'Rival locators may overstake unpatented claims.

E.

A patent conveys the fee simple title within the area
patented and to the full extent of all veins or lodes
which apex within the claim.

F.

The inherent insecurity of title and tenure which are
posed to mining claimants virtually compels a patent
application for any sizeable mining operation.

G.

1.

Mining operations costs hundreds of millions for
environmental studies and permits, water rights,
mills, mining, hauling, treating, smelting, shipp
ing and reclamation.

2.

Mining companies and lenders must have security of
title.

The Mining Law of 1872 extends the right to patent,
that is, the right to purchase fee simple title from
the U.S.
1.

At least $500 worth of development work and a
valuable mineral deposit are required on each
claim.
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2.

The statute is still the same as in 1972, but the
burden of proving entitlement to a patent has
increased substantially.

H.

The applicant for patent bears the burden of proving
entitlement to a patent. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d
836 (D.D.Cir. 1959).

I.

There are three major steps to the patent process.

J.

1.

The mineral survey marks the legal boundaries of
the claim or site.

2.

The patent application is then filed and adjudicated
by the BLM to establish the applicant's eligibility,
available of the land, and the publication of
public notice to allow adverse claims by other
locators.

3.

If a favorable office adjudication results, the
most critical stage ensues, namely the mineral
examination by a U.S. mineral examiner.

4.

If the mineral exam is favorable, the claims are
clearlisted for patent,
and the patent issues in
due course.
(a)

If a valuable mineral discovery is not proved,
the U.S. automatically invalidates the loca
tion rather than just rejecting the patent.
U.S. v. Carlile, 67 I.D. 417 (1960).

(b)

The locator can relocate and continue devel
opment work, at least if the land hasn't been
withdrawn by the U.S. or located by a rival
locator in the interim.

An environmental impact statement is not required by
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, § 4332(C), prior to issuance of a
mineral patent.
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare an EIS for "major federal
actions which significantly affect the quality of the ,
human environment."
1.

The EIS_ is intended to aid the federal agency in
evaluating alternations to the proposed action, to
aid in decision making.
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2.

The issuance of a mineral patent is a ministerial
act which does not require the exercise of discre
tion by Interior. Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic,
28 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1929); Cameron v. U.S., 252
U.S. 450, 454 (1920); Roberts v. U.S., 176 U.S.
221, 231 (1920); U.S. v. Kosanke Sand Corp., 12
IBLA 282, 290-91 (1973); U.S. v. O ’Leary, 63 ID
341 (1956).

3.

Upon satisfying the requirements of the Mining
Law, the claimant has an absolute right to a
patent from the U.S., and the actions by Interior
to process the patent application are not discre
tionary; issuance of a patent can be compelled by
court order. The patent can contain no conditions
not authorized by law. Furthermore, the claimant
need not apply for patent to preserve his property
right in the claim but may extract all the minerals
without ever acquiring full legal title.
The
patent, if issued, conveys fee simple title to the
land, but does nothing to enlarge or diminish the
claimant's right to its locatable minerals. South
Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980)
(quoting the lower court with approval).

,

(a)

The Eight Circuit concluded it is "at least
doubtful" that mineral patent issuances are
actions subject to NEPA.
Also, the Eight
Circuit doubted that an EIS is compatible
with the Secretary's duties under the Mining
Law.
South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190
(8th Cir. 1980) (petition for cert, pending).
Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.D.C. 1979).

(b)

The Eight Circuit held that the issuance of a
mineral patent is not a major federal action
because it does not enable the patentee to
begin mining operations.
Instead, opening a
mine on Forest Service lands will probably
require discretionary actions in the future,
e.g., Forest Service permits for roads, water
pipelines and railroad rights of way.
43
U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) and (a)(6). If these, or
the plan of operations required by the Forest
Service regs., 36 C.F.R. Part 252, are major
federal actions, an EIS may be required then.
South Dakota v. Andrus.
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(c)

The same can be said of other public lands,
namely, if any one of the various permits
required for mineral operations is a major
federal action, an EIS may be first required.

XIV. The hostility of government regulatory officials, encouraged
by private conservation groups, has seriously hampered the
mining industry and has caused a serious shortage of minerals.
A.

True, the mining laws need improvement to better promote
mineral exploration.
1.

The Mining Law of 1872 was enacted over a century
ago for other conditions.

2.

Secure exploration rights to regional areas cannot
be obtained.
Pedis possessio affords only weak
protection against rival locators and none against
the withdrawal by the U.S.

3.

The acreage limits of roughly 20 acres per claim
are insufficient for modern mining projects and
techniques. Economic mining units which cover the
deposit, however shaped, are needed.

4.

Tunnel sites are obsolete but the same type of
protection is not afforded to the replacement,
i.e., deep drill holes.

5.

Extralateral rights are obsolete since dips are
rarely followed at length down dip.
Instead,
protection of access by shafts and adits is needed.

6.

The distinction between lodes and placer deposits
and mill sites is confused and inapplicable to
moder mining, but it remains critical to the
validity of a claim or site.

7.

Mill sites do not provide adequate work space or
tailings space for modern mining methods.

8.

Connecting access between discontinuous claims via
adits is not possible under the present law.

9.

The test of discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
can be applied arbitrarily and unreasonably,
without certainty.

K-44

B.

10.

Governmental withdrawals and Forest Service and
BLM wilderness studies, have removed the great
bulk of public lands from mineral access and
location.

11.

Government administration is bogged down in files
over 100 years old without knowing in many cases
its own ownership, mineral status, withdrawal
areas, and so on. The multitude of studies and
regs. for new programs required by FLPMA of 1976
are only slowly developing.

12.

Tenure and security of title on the public lands
are highly uncertain, for these and other reasons.

Since the first leasing law for leasing of lead mines
from 1807 to 1846, and since the debates from 1900 to
1920 over adoption of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
leasing has been touted as the only cure. Leasing is
supposed to give miners exploration areas and tenure,
and to protect the public by requiring royalties,
diligent exploration, diligent development and mining,
with less environmental damage and more reclamation.
1.

Nevertheless, leasing can be said to be a demon
strated failure under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. H.B. Mock, Mining Law. Trends, 54 U. Denver
L. Rev. 567, 577 (1977).

i
(a)

The Secretary of the Interior has always
declined to lease many lands and many types
of minerals.

(b)

The leasing act minerals are
supply than locatable minerals.

in

shorter

2.

Administrative leasing policies, where the govern
ment leases, have failed to lease economic mining
units which has halted production.
The western
coal industry is an example of an industry stymied
by government agency even though the current and
last two presidents and a multitude of public
institutions consistently announce great increases
in coal production are necessary in the public
interest.

3.

Because of the failure of the leasing system, the
GAO in 1979 recommended the retention of the
location-patent system, albeit with changes to
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improve the tenure of the miner and reasonable
environmental protection. GAO, "Mining Law Reform
and Balanced Resource Management," Feb. 27, 1979.
C.

D.

The right of self-initiation of the miner under the
location system to seek and extract minerals where they
occur on the public lands is essential to survival of
the nation as a leading world power.
1.

The right of access and exploration may properly
be made subject to environmental protection and
careful reclamation.
The mining industry can and
will protect the land.

2.

Congress has not abandoned the location system,
for the foregoing reasons, for 108 years. Despite
the constant cries that it do so, Congress will
not soon make the nation more dependent for min
erals upon hostile government agencies.

A resolution of the conflicts over the dual threats of
major environmental and social harm, on the one hand,
and crippling mineral shortgages, on the other, is
imperative for the national well being.
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